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Note: Regulation of Franchising
Both extolled' and criticized,2 franchising represents a sig-
nificant force in the economy, accounting for approximately 134
billion dollars in annual sales-25 percent of all retail sales and
over 13 percent of the gross national product.3 Moreover, fran-
chising may encourage a desirable dispersion of control of capi-
tal resources by retarding the trend toward economic concentra-
tion in the retail sector.4 Therefore, because of the substantial
effect of franchising on the economy, it is important to elimi-
nate counterproductive practices in this form of marketing.
Although the kinds and number of abusive and destructive
practices that presently exist in franchising operations are
unknown, several have been identified and probably many
more have yet to be exposed. The Federal Trade Commission
recently began an investigation to determine whether illegal
methods have been used to compel restaurant franchisees to
purchase goods and services at artificially inflated prices.5
Abuses have been discovered in the form of hidden markups on
capital assets and other materials that must be purchased by the
franchisee from the franchisor or "approved" vendors.6 Subtle
1. J. ATKINSoN, FRANCHISING: THE ODDS-ON FAVORITE (1968). It
should be noted that this book has drawn some very unfavorable com-
ments. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 92D CONG., IST
SEss., THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FRANCHISING (Comm. Print 1971). It
has been recommended that the International Franchise Association
withdraw the book from circulation because it "presents grossly inaccu-
rate data on failure rates and would be very misleading to potential fran-
chisees." Id. at 66.
2. H. BROWN, FRANCHISING: TRAP FOR THE TRUSTING (1969). The
author states at the outset of his recent revision of this book that he
is not opposed to franchising, but that the system has serious flaws,
which should be remedied. H. BROWN, FRANCHISING-REALITIES & REME-
DIES vii (1973) [hereinafter cited as BROWN].
3. BROWN, supra note 2, at viii.
4. The franchise method of operation has the advantage, from
the standpoint of our American system of competitive economy,
of enabling numerous groups of individuals with small capital
to become entrepreneurs .... The franchise system creates a
class of independent businessmen; it provides the public with
an opportunity to get a uniform product at numerous points of
sale from small independent contractors, rather than employees
of a vast chain. The franchise system of operation is therefore
good for the economy.
Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), affd, 332
F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964).
5. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 25, 1975, at 4, col. 3-4.
6. BROWN, supra note 2, at 9. The author cites examples of exor-
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forms of misrepresentation permeate the initial sale of many
franchises. More than a few unsuspecting franchisees have been
unpleasantly surprised to learn that to operate the business
properly they must toil an average of 70 hours per week, in
addition to the long hours put in by other members of their
families.7
This Note will discuss the kinds of breakdowns that occur in
a franchise relationship, the common-law remedies that have
been applied to deal with those breakdowns, and the inability of
the remedies to provide adequate relief. Similarly, the inadequa-
cy of judicial attempts to apply existing statutory law to the
franchise relationship will be discussed. The alternatives offered
by the statutes of some states will then be explored to deter-
mine if they provide effective solutions to franchise problems.
Finally, against this background, the Note will consider the de-
sirability of regulation at the federal level and analyze the basic
provisions that must be included in any effective federal statute.
I. GENERAL COMMON-LAW AND STATUTORY REMEDIES
Franchising is a phenomenon of the twentieth century;8 the
post-World War II economic boom produced a rapid increase in
this marketing method.9 Unfortunately, growth in franchise op-
erations has outdistanced control by legislatures and courts. Ex-
cept for a few recently enacted state statutes, there is very little
common law or statutory law dealing with the unique problems
bitant profits some franchisors make on products that they require their
franchisees to purchase: $21.50 for a spice package costing $3.00, $7.45
for chicken dip which costs $2.00, and $4.50 for a gallon of cherries nor-
mally selling for $1.50. Id. at 79-80.
7. Id. at 78. Of course, people who acquire franchised businesses
differ greatly. Some purchasers are experienced businessmen with a
firm grasp of the economic realities of operating a franchise. Others
have always desired to own their own business but are without previous
business experience. These vast differences among franchisees, which
may ultimately determine the success or failure of a particular franchised
operation, create problems in the drafting of effective legislation. The
franchisor should not be made responsible for these differences.
8. C. ROSENFIELD, THE LAW OF FRANCHISING (1970). The years
from 1910 to 1940 witnessed the growth of franchise systems. Early ap-
plications were in the automobile industry and the soft drink bottling
industry.
9. Growth has continued in recent years. In 1969 franchising oper-
ations had sales of 90 billion dollars, which represented more than 20
percent of all retail sales and almost nine percent of the gross national
product. By 1972 annual sales had increased to 134 billion dollars, which
represented 25 percent of all retail sales and over 13 percent of the gross
national product. BROWN, supra note 2, at viii.
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of the franchise relationship. Because of the absence of law
precisely addressed to the abuses prevalent in franchising, the
courts have been compelled to apply general common-law prin-
ciples and those statutes that conceivably address some aspect of
the franchise relationship.
A. DEFINING THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP
The initial task of courts dealing with franchising abuses is
to define the essential characteristics of the franchise relation-
ship. The basic difficulty lies in the broad range of relationships
that franchising entails.10 The franchise relationship has charac-
teristics associated with the legal relationships of agency, em-
ployment, and independent contracting. Yet because it fits so
badly into any of these traditional classifications, franchising
has generally been considered sui generis." Nevertheless, the
courts must continue to apply to franchise relationships the case
law or statutory provisions developed with more traditional re-
lationships in view.12
B. ENTERING THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP
The prospective franchisee, upon initial contact with a fran-
chisor, will have a profusion of statistics thrust upon him. This
information, willingly supplied by the franchisor,13 attempts to
prove that success will inevitably follow if he becomes a mem-
ber of the franchise group. Any unwary franchisee may easily be
swept away in this flood of "sellers talk."'14 Without any directly
10. One view of franchising is that it is not itself an "industry" in
the usual sense but a system of distribution, a technique of integrating
a distribution system by contract instead of by classical chain ownership.
Fels, Legal Problems in Franchising-An Overview, in BusINEss AND
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE FRANCHISE 7, 9 (Practicing Law Institute vol. 10,
1968). The author lists three types of franchise systems: (1) an entire
retail business operation, such as a drive-in restaurant, a motel, or a car
rental business; (2) a distribution system for a particular product, such
as automobiles or gasoline; and (3) trademark or brand name licensing
for processing plants, such as soft drink bottling plants.
11. D. THOMPSON, FRANCHISE OPERATONS AND ANTITRUST 6 (1971).
12. C. ROSENFIELD, supra note 8, at 8.
13. This problem will be especially acute in those situations in
which the franchisor relies heavily on the initial sale of the franchise
for his profit, rather than on the continued dealing between the parties.
14. Indeed, this could be only the beginning of the franchisee's inor-
dinate reliance on the franchisor:
This emotional dream, the desire of every American to own his
own business, to be his own boss, has many pitfalls, because he
is easy prey for the hot-shot promoter, and I think because the
stakes are so high here, that these small businessmen very
19751 1029
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applicable common-law or statutory regulation, the courts have
been forced to apply the simple rules of fraud in the induce-
ment of a contract when dealing with a franchisor's misrepre-
sentations.15
The common-law action for fraud has limited usefulness in
dealing with abuses by the franchisor. It is ofterl viewed as
unsatisfactory because it affords only an "after the fact" reme-
dy.' 6 In most cases when the remedy is obtained the franchise
has already paid the franchise fee and may have incurred sub-
stantial losses in operating the business.'7 Often, the franchisee
will not even file a complaint.'8 It is true that, although fraud
has been difficult to prove, there has been a movement toward
resolving any doubt in favor of the allegedly defrauded party.m
Intentional misstatement of a material fact upon which the
franchisee relies might therefore offer the courts the opportuni-
ty to use the classical rules of deceit. But since tort recovery
might be limited to cases in which the franchisee can show that
the franchisor's original offer is fraudulent, 20 far more effective
protection would be available if an affirmative duty of full
disclosure could be developed for the franchise relationship sim-
often scrape up every dime they can borrow, beg or steal...
and put it all on one dream and hope of a franchise concept that
very likely could have been misleading and misrepresentative
[sic] and fraudulent.
Hearings on the Impact of Franchising on Small Business Before the
Subcomm. on Urban and Rural Economic Development of the Senate Se-
lect Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 190 (1970) (statement
of John Y. Brown, Jr., president of Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp.).
15. BRowN, supra note 2, at 62.
16. Augustine & Hrusoff, Franchise Regulation, 21 HASTINGS L.J.
1347, 1373 (1970).
17. Id.
18. Hearings, supra note 14, at 595-96. California State Senator
Clark Bradley gave four reasons for the failure to file complaints: (1)
the typical victim is embarrassed at having been swindled and is thus
reluctant to file a complaint; (2) he believes that he cannot help his
cause by filing a complaint; (3) he hopes to salvage his investment, and
spends more time and money trying to do so, thus incurring further
losses; and (4) he feels that it is too late for recourse because of the
time span between the payment of the franchise fee and the discovery
of the fraud. Id. at 597.
19. Cf. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94
Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971) (burden of proof shifted to defendant in consumer
fraud cases); Rigot v. Bucci, 245 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1971) (precedents re-
quiring clear and convincing evidence or another quantum of proof
greater than preponderance of the evidence overruled in a case in-
volving fraud in the sale of a publishing franchise).
20. Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-Fran-
chise Cancellations, 1967 DuKE L.J. 465, 485.
[Vol. 59:10271030
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ilar to the disclosure requirements in securities law. 21 This is an
area, however, in which the courts require legislative direction.
The franchise agreement could conceivably be deemed an
"investment contract" within the meaning of section 2(1) of the
Securities Act of 1933,22 and thus, subject to the registration
and disclosure provisions of the securities laws.23 The primary
issue, articulated by the United States Supreme Court in SEC v.
W.J. Howey Co.,24 is whether the franchise agreement is "a
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely
from the efforts of the promotor or a third party .... ,,25
The attempts by some courts to apply the Securities Act to
franchise agreements may be viewed as a recognition of the
inadequacy of more traditional remedies. The full disclosure
requirements and the private enforcement provisions of the se-
curities laws would offer the franchisee additional remedies be-
yond those available at common law or by the use, for example,
of the antitrust statutes.26 This theory, however, has not flour-
ished on the federal level.27 Nor has much optimism been in-
21. See, e.g., A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD, SEC RULE 10b-5
(1973).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).
23. Augustine & Hrusoff, supra note 16; Goodwin, Franchising Law
Matures, 28 Bus. LAw. 703 (1973); Goodwin, Franchising in the Econ-
omy: The Franchise Agreement as a Security under Securities Acts,
Including 10b-5 Considerations, 24 Bus. LAw. 1311 (1969); Comment, The
Franchise as a Security: Application of the Securities Laws to Owner-
Operated Franchises, 11 B.C. Ii. & CoM. L. REv. 228 (1969); Comment,
What is a Security? Howey, Turner Enterprises and Franchise Agree-
ments, 22 KA.. L. REv. 55 (1973); Comment, Franchisor Liability Under
Securities Law, 13 WASHBuRN L.J. 68 (1974). But see Coleman, A Fran-
chise Agreement: Not a "Security" Under the Securities Act of 1933,
22 Bus. LAw. 493 (1967).
24. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
25. Id. at 298-99 (emphasis added).
26. Section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j (1970), and SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974), offer
a much more liberal method of enforcing compliance by private action
than the antitrust laws. See text accompanying notes 33-41 infra. Rule
10b-5 is being used "to build a national anti-fraud law, more liberal,
broad, flexible and encompassing than common law remedies or state
antitrust statutes." Goodwin, Franchising in the Economy: The Fran-
chise Agreement as a Security Under Securities Acts, Including 10b-5
Considerations, 24 Bus LAw. 1311, 1321 (1969). For discussion of the
problem with private enforcement of antitrust laws, see Comment, Pri-
vate Enforcement of Antitrust Laws: Damages Recoverable for an Ille-
gal Tying Arrangement, 78 DIcK. L. REV. 305 (1973).
27. See, e.g., Belhumeur v. Dawson, 229 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mont. 1964)
(shareholders of corporate franchisee held not to be "security" holders
1031
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spired by the position taken by the Securities and Exchange
Commission:
While the Commission has not taken the position that a fran-
chise arrangement necessarily involves the offer and sale of a
security, in the Commission's view a security is offered or sold
where the franchisee is not required to make significant efforts
in the operation of the franchise in order to obtain the prom-
ised return.28
This interpretation severely limits the applicability of securities
law in the ordinary franchise relationship where both the fran-
chisor and the franchisee participate actively in the venture.
The application of securities law to franchising has had only
limited success at the state level. The attorney general of Cali-
fornia has acknowledged that a franchise agreement may consti-
tute a security within the meaning of the California Corporate
Securities Law. 29 While the opinion spoke of the Howey nominal
involvement situation, it also contemplated an alternative, the
"risk capital" situation, in which the franchisor intends to use
the franchise fee to finance the goods and services he has con-
tracted to supply.30 The latter approach disregards the amount
of activity by the franchisee. But with only a few exceptions,3 1
the courts have not accepted this theory.32
of franchisor); Drug Management, Inc. v. Dart Drug Corp., [1961-64
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. [ 91,293 (D.D.C. 1963) (fran-
chise agreement held not to be a security, because the franchisee, with
control over selection of location, employees, and hours of operation, was
not led to expect profits from the efforts of others).
28. Securities Act Release No. 5211 (Nov. 30, 1971). This reasoning
was applied in Lino v. City Investment Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973)
(franchise licensing agreement held not to be an "investment contract"
within section 2(1)).
29. 49 Op. CAL. ATT'Y GN. 124 (1967), [1961-1971 Transfer Binder]
BLUE SxY L. REP. 1 70,747 (1967).
30. Id. at 127-28.
31. State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Bus. Sys., Inc., 482 P.2d
549 (Ore. App. 1971) (franchise agreements held to be "investment con-
tracts" where franchisor was dependent upon money paid in by its
franchisees for a substantial portion of its initial capital); Hurst v.
Dare To Be Great, Inc., 474 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1973) (applying Oregon
law and following Healy).
32. See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 588, 593
(N.D. Ga. 1973):
For now at least, this court does not regard the "risk capital"
theory to be so well-established as to support the conclusion that
in commercial and legal circles in this nation arrangements
which are not "profit-sharing" agreements or "investment con-
tracts" are nevertheless "commonly" thought to be securities,
if they fit within the scope of the "risk capital" theory.
1032 [Vol. 59:1027
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C. THE ONGOn G FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP
Many of the problems that occur after the franchise agree-
ment has been consummated may come within the purview of
the antitrust laws,33 under which the courts may examine the
reasonableness of the controls and restrictions imposed by the
franchisor in the franchise agreement.34 The courts have dealt
with illegal price maintenance and price fixing,35 exclusive
dealing and tying arrangements,3 6 territorial and customer re-
strictions,37 and exclusive arrangements and refusals to deal
with others in a territory.38 Antitrust suits, however, are noto-
riously expensive and time-consuming. The practicing attorneys
on whom the franchisee will rely for advice when contemplat-
ing the purchase of a franchise or when seeking to redress a
complaint during the ongoing relationship often have little fa-
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
34. Comment, Franchise Regulation: An Appraisal of Recent State
Legislation, 13 B.C. IwD. & Com. L. REv. 529, 535 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as State Legislation]. See also D. THOMPSON, FRAN CisE OPERATioNs ANm
ANTITRUST (1971); Comment, Antitrust Barriers to Franchising, 61 GEO.
L.J. 189 (1972); Comment, Franchising and the Antitrust Laws: An
Overview, 51 TENN. L. REV. 535 (1974); Note, Franchisor Standing to
Sue in Treble Damages Actions, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 696 (1971); Comment,
Franchise Tie-ins and Antitrust: A Critical Analysis, 1973 WIs. L. REv.
847.
35. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (territorial re-
straints that are part of an unlawful price fixing arrangement held to
be illegal per se); United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127 (1966)
(restraint of price competition held to be illegal when sought to be car-
ried out by a combination or conspiracy).
36. Siegal v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972) (economic power sufficient to restrain free
competition inferred from the use of tying arrangements). Contra,
Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 381 U.S. 125 (1965) (per se violation not found,
because the franchisor did not so dominate the industry as to restrain
competition).
The "per se" rule regarding tied products was set down in Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958):
They [tying arrangements] are unreasonable in and of them-
selves whenever a party has sufficient economic power with re-
spect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competi-
tion in the market for the tied product and a "not insubstantial"
amount of interstate commerce is affected.
37. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)
(territorial limitations on resales by distributors and limitations on sales
by distributors to "franchised dealers" only held to be illegal).
38. Id.; Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899
(D. Md. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956) (franchisor
allowed to exercise his independent judgment in deciding to whom to
grant a franchise, but failure to renew considered illegal when it pro-
duces an unreasonable restraint of trade or a monopoly).
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miliarity with federal antitrust law.3 9 Moreover, the antitrust
remedy is also "after the fact," and frequently the franchisee
will be insolvent or nearly so at the very time he needs to hire
experienced antitrust counsel. There is not even a guarantee
that the franchise will still exist.40 If an injured franchisee
incurs substantial legal expenses, in addition to his operational
losses, his successful antitrust litigation may be a Pyrrhic victo-
ry, since the defeated franchisor may be forced into bankruptcy
by a treble damages judgment. On the other hand, if the fran-
chisee does not obtain legal representation, he suffers his oper-
ating losses without possibility of recovery. It must be conclud-
ed that the antitrust laws, which do not even reach many
significant franchise abuses, 41 are ineffective in dealing with the
problems encountered in the franchise relationship.
D. TERMINATING THE FRANcIsE RELATIONSHIP
Perhaps the most flagrant of all franchise abuses to which
the franchisee is subject is the unjust nonrenewal or termina-
tion of the franchise relationship.42 Since the franchise agree-
ment is a form contract prepared by the franchisor, and since
there is no equality of bargaining power between the parties,
the contract provisions are certain, to favor the franchisor.43
The equities in favor of the terminated franchisee are often
substantial. The amount of time and money he has invested in
his franchise operation may be sizable, but he may receive little
or nothing for his business upon termination.44 The mere threat
of termination may be effectively employed to force him to
39. "Franchisors rely strongly on this deficiency by going through
the motions of advising a franchisee to 'consult an attorney' and they
deliberately rely on the high cost of litigation to flout federal statutes."
BROWN, supra note 2, at 149.
40. See Loveland, Franchise Regulation: Ohio Considers Legisla-
tion to Protect the Franchisee, 33 Omo STATE L.J. 643 (1972).
41. "The antitrust laws do not apply to franchisor misrepresenta-
tions, to the sale of a franchise by a bankrupt franchise company or one
run by criminals, or to restrictions dealing with the transfer, renewal or
termination of the franchise." State Legislation, supra note 34, at 536.
42. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BusINEss, 92D CONG., 1ST SESS.,
THE EcoNoMIc EFFEcTS OF FRANCHISING 269 (Comm. Print 1971).
43. Rosenfield, Franchising and the Lawyer, 42 FLA. B.J. 17 (1968).
The author concludes that if a franchisor "is willing to give away any
part of its basic contract, it can only indicate a fatal weakness in the
structure and philosophy of the company." Id. at 22.
44. It has been argued that the franchisee obtains a proprietary in-
terest in the franchise and upon termination he deserves some compensa-




agree to the franchisor's demands even when it is not in his best
interests. Yet the courts have had to struggle to offer a termi-
nated franchisee a measure of relief.45
Professor Williston declared that in every contract there ex-
ists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.46 Bor-
rowing from the so-called Missouri doctrine of agency law,47
some courts have held, in effect, that if the franchise investment
is substantial and the relationship is established for an indefi-
nite duration, it cannot be terminated until after a reasonable
period of time has elapsed. 48 One commentator has suggested
that when the termination of a franchise is discriminatory, the
concepts of waiver49 and estoppel ° could be used to give relief.
Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code has even been
proposed as a source of suitable remedies for unjust franchise
terminations.51 Other commentators have sought to impose fidu-
ciary duties upon the franchisor,52 and at least one court has
adopted this theory in dealing with a franchise termination
45. Gellhorn, supra note 20, at 468. Despite compelling evidence
of gross inequity in franchise terminations, courts often invoke "freedom
of contract" and hold the franchisor's conduct to only minimum levels
of fairness.
46. 11 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1295, at 38-42 (3d ed. 1968). See
Lutz v. Bayberry Huntington, Inc., 86 Misc. 603, 148 N.Y.S.2d 762, 767(Sup. Ct. 1956) (implied covenant in every contract that neither party
will do anything to destroy or injure the rights of the other party to
receive the fruits of the contract).
47. Gellhorn, supra note 20, at 479-80.
48. What a reasonable time is depends upon the circumstances
in a particular case. Among the circumstances to be consider-
ed in determining reasonable time are: The amount of pre-
liminary and promotional expenditures, the length of time the
distributorship has been in operation before notice of termina-
tion, what the prospects for forfeiture profits are, and whether
it has proven profitable during actual operation.
General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Distributors, Inc., 253 N.C. 459, 472, 117
S.E.2d 479, 489 (1960).
49. A franchisor could be deemed to have waived the right to termi-
nate if the condition in the contract has not been previously enforced.
Gellhorn, supra note 20, at 488.
50. A franchisor who dispenses with the performance of a contract
condition could be deemed estopped from subsequently asserting that
condition, if it is reasonably foreseeable that the franchisee would change
his position in reliance. Id. at 487.
51. Article Two could be considered applicable by analogy to fran-
chise agreements, to effectuate the basic policies of simplifying, clarify-
ing, and modernizing commercial transactions. Comment, Article Two
of the Uniform Commercial Code and Franchise Distribution Agree-
ments, 1969 DuxE L.J. 959.
52. Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEX. L. REV.
650 (1971); Rosenfield, Big Brother as a Fiduciary; Suing the Franchisor,
76 CASE & Com., July-Aug. 1971, at 38.
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case.53 The courts, however, have not been willing to adopt any
of these theories of relief except in isolated cases. Therefore,
legislation dealing with the rights of each party is necessary
before the franchisee can be adequately protected.54
IL STATE FRANCHISE REGULATION
In recent years a considerable amount of state legislation
has been enacted to deal specifically with the franchise relation-
ship. At least 15 states now have broad legislation regulat-
ing franchise relationships in some manner.Y' The scope of this
statutory regulation varies significantly from state to state, but
most of the statutes are primarily concerned either with full
disclosure of relevant facts by the franchisor at the beginning of
the relationship56 or with the abuses that result from unjust
53. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfield, 72 Misc. 2d 392, 339 N.Y.S.2d
623 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1972), it was held that a franchisee acquires a
vested interest in the franchise, and the franchisor has a duty to deal
with the franchisee in good faith throughout the relationship. That duty
was breached when the franchisor sought to illegally coerce the fran-
chisee to purchase accessories, and therefore the franchisor could not re-
cover possession of the property by an attempted termination.
54. Franchise legislation must not forbid the necessary contract pro-
visions that franchisors use to protect themselves. Franchisors deal with
a wide assortment of franchisees. See note 7 =pra. Even though most
franchisors are quite careful in screening potential franchisees, it is pos-
sible that unreliable persons may be awarded franchises. The franchisor
must have adequate contract provisions to enable him to quickly remedy
the situation if, for example, amounts due him for goods and services
are not forthcoming. In addition, the effectiveness of franchising de-
pends greatly on the continued goodwill created by successful franchised
businesses. An improperly operated franchise can have an adverse effect
on the whole system.
55. Aim. STAT. ANN. § 70-801 et seq. (Supp. 1973); CAL. CORP. CODE§ 31000 et seq. (West Supp. 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133e
et seq. (Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2551 et seq. (1974); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 817.416 (Supp. 1975); HAwAII REv. STAT. § 482E-1 et seq.
(Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , § 701 et seq. (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1974); MINN. STAT. § 80C.01 et seq. (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-1
et seq. (Supp. 1975); ORE. REv. STAT. § 650.005 et seq. (1974); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 19-28-1 et seq. (Supp. 1974); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §
37-5A-1 et seq. (Supp. 1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-557 et seq. (1973);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.100.010 et seq. (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 553.01 et seq. (Spec. Pamphlet 1974).
56. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31001 (West Supp. 1975); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 482E-1 (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1212, § 702 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1974); MNuI. STAT. §§ 80C.04-.13 (1974); Oas. REv. STAT. § 650.020
(1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 19-28-2 (Supp. 1974); S.D. Comp. LAWS
ANN. ch. 37-5A (Supp. 1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-563 (1973); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.100.040-.170 (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
553.26-.41 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974).
1036 [Vol. 59:1027
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termination of the relationship. 57 A few states have also at-
tempted to regulate the ongoing franchise relationship by impos-
ing "good faith" standards of conduct upon the parties to a
franchise agreement,58 while Arkansas has conferred upon itself
a "most favored nation" status, prohibiting a franchisor from
charging a royalty fee greater than the customary fee then in
use elsewhere in the United States.59 Other states have regulat-
ed particular franchise businesses such as automobile dealer-
ships, 0 alcoholic beverage wholesale businesses,61 and petroleum
products distributorships.62
A. DEFINING THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP
Although a number of approaches have been used by the
states to regulate the franchise relationship, every statute must
contain a comprehensive definitional section, carefully drafted
to keep the operation of the law within reasonable bounds. Be-
cause franchising is a nebulous concept, even well-drafted legis-
lation could include many business relationships that need not
be regulated.63 Three basic statutory approaches have been em-
57. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133f (Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 2552-54 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-5 (Supp. 1974).
58. HAWAu REv. STAT. § 482E-6 (Supp. 1974); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 19.100.180 (Supp. 1974). To a limited extent the states of Minnesota
and Virginia have also attempted to set down standards of conduct for
the ongoing relationship. Mnn-. STAT. § 80C.14 (1974); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-558 (1973).
59. ARx. STAT. ANN. § 70-802 (Supp. 1973). The law as originally
enacted in 1971 had required an Arkansas franchisee to pay no more than
the lowest royalty fee charged anywhere in the United States, Ark. Gen.
Acts 1971, ch. 252, § 2, but the constitutionality of that requirement was
seriously questioned. See Hearings on the Role of Small Business in
Franchising Before the Subcomm. on Minority Business Enterprise and
Franchising of the House Comm. on Small Business, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
17-18 (1973).
60. Am. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-1301 et seq. (Supp. 1973); GA. CODE
AwN. § 84-6601 et seq. (Supp. 1974); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 190.010 et
seq. (Supp. 1974); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 93B (1975); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 63-17-51 et seq. (1972); NEB. REv. STAT. § 60-1420 et seq. (1974); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 357-B (Supp. 1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-37-1 et
seq. (Supp. 1973); Oxo REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.71 et seq. (Page Supp.
1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, ch. 62 (Supp. 1974); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 4413 (36) (Supp. 1975).
61. M . AN. CODE art. 2B, § 203A et seq. (Supp. 1974); Nav. REV.
STAT. § 598.290 et seq. (1973); Ariz. Laws 1974, ch. 103; S.C. Laws 1974,
act 969.
62. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 167A et seq. (Supp. 1974); MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 93E (1975); Ariz. Laws 1974, ch. 195, § 3; Iowa Laws 1974, ch.
1198; La. Laws 1974, act 628.
63. For example, a local retailer may be called a "franchised
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ployed to define the concept of a franchise, the term on which
all other definitions turn. One approach defines the franchise on
the basis of the substantial control exercised by the franchisor
and the substantial association with his marketing system. This
might be called a "captive marketing plan" definition. A second
technique is to phrase the definition of a franchise in terms of
the common interest which the parties to a franchise agreement
have in the success of the arrangement. The typical statutory
language refers to the "community of interest" in the business
arrangement. A third, the "mutual financial benefit" method of
definition, requires a continuing financial interest between the
parties, in addition to the licensing of a basic marketing plan.
The California Franchise Investment Law illustrates the
"captive marketing plan" approach:
"Franchise" means a contract or agreement, either expressed
or implied, whether oral or written, between two or more per-
sons by which:
(a) A franchisee is granted the right to engage in the busi-
ness of offering, selling or distributing goods or services under
a marketing plan or system prescribed in substantial part by a
franchisor; and
(b) The operation of the franchisee's business pursuant to
such plan or system is substantially associated with the fran-
chisor's trademark, service mark, trade name, logotype, adver-
tising or other commercial symbol designating the franchisor
or its affiliate; and
(c) The franchisee is required to pay, directly or indi-
rectly, a franchise fee.64
Four other states have adopted almost identical language.6 5 The
use of the word "substantial" in paragraphs (a) and (b) appears
to enable a franchisor to escape the statutory definition by lim-
iting his control over the franchise system.6 6 If the system is to
operate successfully, however, it is imperative that the franchi-
sor exercise control over the nature and quality of the goods
and services the franchisee offers. A significant part of the for-
dealer" by one of his manufacturer-suppliers, even though the retailer
is not required to pay a franchise fee, or to carry the supplied products
exclusively, or to pay any percentage of gross sales to the manufacturer-
supplier. This situation is illustrative of a conventional retail business
relationship which ought to escape the control of franchising legislation.
64. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31005 (West Supp. 1975).
65. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , § 703(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974);
ORE. REv. STAT. § 650.005(4) (1974); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 19-28-3(c)
(Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANx. § 553.03 (4) (Spec. Pamphlet 1974). Two
states have adopted parts (a) and (b) of the definition. CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 42-133e (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-559 (b) (1973).
66. See State Legislation, supra note 34, at 542.
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mula which has made franchising so successful is the delivery of
a uniform product to consumers in different parts of the coun-
try.67 In addition, franchisors are under the mandate of the
Lanham Act 68 to control the quality, appearance, and perform-
ance of the goods and services supplied by franchisees to the
general public, or suffer the loss of their trademarks.6 9 There-
fore, the use of "substantial" in the definition of a "franchise"
does not provide an easy escape from statutory coverage.
Paragraph (c) requires payment of a franchise fee as a
prerequisite to inclusion under the statute. While the California
and Wisconsin statutes set no minimum amount, the Illinois, Ore-
gon, and Rhode Island statutes require a franchise fee of 100
dollars or more.70 Presumably, a prospective franchisee does not
need statutory protection when he is obliged to pay only a small
sum. It might be possible to avoid such a franchise statute by
devising a method of compensation other than the conventional
franchise fee.71 The California statute accordingly encompasses
a wide range of franchise payment methods by broadly defining
a franchise fee to include "any fee or charge that a franchisee
... is required to pay.., for the right to enter into a business
under a franchise agreement .... "72 This language, construed
with the words "directly or indirectly" in paragraph (c) of the
definition, results in statutory coverage based on forms of pay-
ment other than the conventional franchise fee.73
67. Flynn, The Regulation of Franchise Sales, 40 J. KAN. B. Ass'x
121 (1971). The author of this article is general counsel for Pizza Hut,
Inc.
68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1064(e) (1), 1127 (1970).
69. Flynn, supra note 67, at 123. For further elaboration of the rela-
tionship of franchising to the federal trademark laws, see Collison,
Trademarks-The Cornerstone of a Franchise System, 24 Sw. L.J. 247(1970); Comment, Trademark Franchising and Antitrust Sanctions: The
Need for a Limited Rule of Reason, 52 BOSTON U.L. REV. 463 (1972); Note,
Franchise Terminations and Refusals to Renew: The Lanham Act and
Preemption of State Regulation, 60 IowA L. REv. 122 (1974); 6 RUTGERS-
CAMDEN L.J. 155 (1974).
70. ImL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121%, § 703(1) (c) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1974); ORE. REV. STAT. § 650.005(6) (1974); R.I. GEN. LAws AN . § 19-
28-3 (c) (3) (Supp. 1974). The Virginia statute does not require a fran-
chise fee.
71. See Woll, Sources of Revenue to the Franchisor and Their Stra-
tegic Implications, 44 J. RETAILxnG, Winter 1968-69, at 14. The author
suggests eight principal ways a franchisor might secure revenue: initial
franchise fee; royalties; rental of premises; sale or lease of equipment;
sale of supplies and raw materials; sale of finished franchise products;
sale of territorial rights; and partial ownership. Id. at 14-18.
72. CAL.. CORP. CODE § 31011 (West Supp. 1975).
73. The laws of California, Illinois, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin all
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The New Jersey Franchise Practices Act7 4 is an example of
the "community of interest" definitional approach. The New
Jersey definition requires the grant of a license to use a trade-
mark, trade name, or other commercial symbol in which there is
a community of interest in the marketing of goods or services.7 5
The "community of interest" concept is also an element of the
statutory definitions in Minnesota and South Dakota.7 6 This
concept is less definite than the "captive marketing plan" defini-
tions, because "community of interest" is not defined in the
statutes. The concept has been judicially construed, in the con-
text of a joint venture, as "an interest common to both parties
... in which each and all are reciprocally concerned and from
which each and all derive a material benefit and sustain a mu-
tual responsibility."7 7 Other courts have found that a "commu-
nity of interest" creates such a relationship of trust and confi-
dence that it is inequitable to allow one of the parties to
perform any act which might prejudice the others.7 8 Such lan-
guage could be found to create fiduciary duties in the franchise
relationship. This was the result reached by one court consider-
ing the termination of a service station lease, although the deci-
sion occurred in a state without franchise legislation.7 9 No state
with a "community of interest" statute has imposed fiduciary
duties upon the parties to a franchise agreement. The statutes of
those states contain fewer definitional requirements than the
"captive marketing plan" statutes. This may result in a more
sweeping application of the statutes, but that must await judi-
cial interpretation.
specifically exclude from the definition of a franchise fee: (1) the pur-
chase of goods at a bona fide wholesale price; (2) reasonable service
charges paid to a credit card company by a retailer who honors such
credit cards; and (3) amounts paid to trading stamp companies to use
their products. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31011 (West Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 121,h, § 703(14) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); RI. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 19-28-3(i) (Supp. 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 553.03(7) (Spec.
Pamphlet 1974). California limits section (1) to a quantity of goods that
a reasonable businessman normally would purchase. CAL. CORP. CODE §
31011 (West Supp. 1975).
74. N.J. STAT. ANq. § 56: 10-1 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
75. Id. § 56:10-3 (a).
76. MInN. STAT. § 80C.01 (4) (b) (1974); S.D. CoMp. LAWS ANx. §
37-5A-1 (2) (Supp. 1974).
77. Carboneau v. Peterson, 1 Wash. 2d 347, 376, 95 P.2d 1043, 1055(1939).
78. Booker v. Crocker, 132 F. 7, 8 (8th Cir. 1904). See also Wheeler
v. Abilene Nat'l Bank Bldg. Co., 159 F. 391, 393 (8th Cir. 1908); Jones
v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., 144 F. 765, 771 (8th Cir. 1906).
79. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 72 Misc. 2d 392, 339 N.Y.S.2d 623
(N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1972). See note 53 supra.
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Washington's Franchise Investment Protection Act 0 repre-
sents the "mutual financial benefit" definitional method. It is a
compromise between the detailed California statute and the in-
definite New Jersey definition. The Washington statute defines a
"franchise" as a business engaged in offering, selling, or distrib-
uting goods or services, and involving the payment of a fran-
chise fee, either directly or indirectly, and the licensing of a
trademark, service mark, or other similar characteristic in
which there is a "community interest."8' The "community inter-
est" concept in this statute is specifically defined as a "continu-
ing financial interest" between the parties involved in the op-
eration of the franchised business.8 2 This obviates the judicial
search for a suitable common-law definition, which is required
in a state with a "community of interest" statute. The Washing-
ton statute also provides a more complete definition of a fran-
chise fee, including any payment "either in lump sum or by
installments of an initial capital investment fee, any fee or
charges based upon a percentage of gross or net sales ... or
any training fees .... ,8 The California statute is not as expli-
cit in its definition of a franchise fee, but perhaps this is desir-
able, since a franchisor who derives his compensation solely from
sales of the franchised product to the franchisee may avoid the
narrower definition of the Washington statute. The numerous
franchise payment devices which a franchisor might use illus-
trate the need to retain flexibility in the definition of a fran-"
chise fee.84
A few states have attempted to define the franchise rela-
tionship in other terms. Arkansas defines a franchise as a "con-
tinuing commercial relationship,"8 5 while Florida requires the
franchisee's business to be "substantially reliant" on the fran-
chisor for its supply of basic goods.8 6 Delaware's law is applica-
80. WASH. REV. CODE ANx. § 19.100 (Supp. 1974).
81. Id. § 19.100.010 (4). The recently enacted Hawaii Franchise In-
vestment Law also adopts this definitional approach. HAwAu'REv. STAT.
ANN. § 482E-2 (Supp. 1974).
82. WASH. REV. CODE ANw. § 19.100.010 (2) (Supp. 1974).
83. Id. § 19.100.010(11).
84. See note 71 supra.
85. ARK. STAT. AwN. § 70-801(a) (Supp. 1973). This statute, lim-
ited to royalty fees and advertising fees, does not have a large impact
on franchising within the state.
86. FLA. STAT. AxN. § 817.416(1) (b) (4) (Supp. 1975). It is prob-
able that the "substantially reliant" requirement exempts from the cov-
erage of the statute all franchisors who permit their franchisees to pur-
chase their supplies from third parties. State Legislation, supra note 34,
at 544.
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ble only to businesses that act as middlemen between a franchi-
sor and retail outlets.8 7 These statutes lack sufficient breadth to
effectively regulate most franchise relationships.
B. ENTERING THE FRANcms. RELATIONSHIP: DiscLosUPx PRoTEC-
TION
A prevalent abuse occurring at the inception of a franchise
relationship is the subtle deceit used to induce the franchisee to
join the system. A former general counsel of a large fast-food
chain has reported that the industry has "grossly oversold itself
with promotions that were designed to work on the unrealistic
hopes . . . of the naive."8 In an effort to remedy the abuses in
this area, 10 states have enacted disclosure legislation.80 Inher-
ent in this legislation is a belief that a fully informed prospec-
tive franchisee will make an intelligent investment decision.20
California was the first state to enact a franchise disclosure
law, and it has served as a model for other disclosure statutes.
The crucial section of the law sets out 22 specific items that
must be disclosed in a registration statement filed with the
state, including the name and business address of the franchi-
sor; the business experience of those affiliated with the franchi-
sor; whether any person associated with the franchisor has been
convicted of a felony or is subject to any injunctive action relat-
ing to business activity; a recent financial statement; a typical
franchise agreement; a statement of all fees which the franchi-
87. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2551 (1974).
88. Corliss, Franchising: Time for a New Beginning? The Lawyer's
Responsibility, 15 BOSTON B.J., Sept. 1971, at 7.
89. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31000 et seq. (West Supp. 1975); HAwAII REV.
STAT. § 482E-1 et seq. (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , § 701
et seq. (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); MINw. STAT. § 80C.01 et seq. (1974);
Opa. REv. STAT. § 650.005 et seq. (1974); RI. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 19-28-1
et seq. (Supp. 1974); S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 37-5A-1 et seq. (Supp.
1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-557 et seq. (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 19.100.010 et seq. (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 553.01 et seq. (Spec.
Pamphlet 1974).
90. The California Franchise Investment Law states:
California franchisees have suffered substantial losses where
the franchisor or his representative has not provided full and
complete information regarding the franchisor-franchisee rela-
tionship, the details of the contract between the franchisor and
franchisee, and the prior business experience of the franchisor.
It is the intent of this law to provide each prospective fran-
chisee with the information necessary to make an intelligent de-
cision regarding the franchise being offered.
CAL. CoRP. CODE § 31001 (West Supp. 1975). The effectiveness of such
a statute depends on the sophistication of franchisees, which varies con-
siderably from case to case. See note 7 supra.
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see may be required to pay; and any other information which
the commissioner of corporations may reasonably require.91
Most state disclosure statutes require similar information.9 2
The Oregon statute, however, does not enumerate the specific
information which is required to be disclosed. The Oregon cor-
poration commissioner is granted the discretion to require per-
sons who sell franchises within the state to file an informational
report revealing to whom a franchise has been sold and the
amount of proceeds received.93 The statute does not operate as a
true disclosure law, since a prospective franchisee has no right
to even a limited disclosure of pertinent information with which
he might make a rational investment decision. This section of
the statute merely provides the means to monitor the level of
franchise sales within the state.
The Virginia statute requires the franchisor to supply "such
relevant information as the state corporation commission may
require."94 The commission has discretion to require as full a
disclosure as it deems necessary. The statute, however, does not
indicate whether a single standard is to be applied to all fran-
chisors, or if the commission may vary the degree of disclosure
among individual franchisors. The latter interpretation seems
more consistent with the absolute discretion vested in the com-
mission, but a uniform disclosure requirement would better pro-
tect against the undue exercise of that discretion. The interests
of prospective franchisees are served, since they have a right to
examine the information disclosed.95 The statute does not pro-
vide for disclosure directly to the prospective franchisee.
In states which have modeled their disclosure statutes after
California's, the disclosed information is filed in a registration
statement. The state can scrutinize the information to determine
if the franchisor qualifies to do business in the state. If the
financial arrangements appear inadequate, the state frequently
may escrow the franchise fee until appropriate arrangements
are made.9 6 Crucial to the successful protection of franchises,
91. Id. § 31111.
92. HAWAn REV. STAT. § 482E-3 (Supp. 1974); ILL. AxN. STAT. ch.
1211/, § 705 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); MUN. STAT. § 80C.04 (1974); R.I.
GEN. LAws ANx. § 19-28-5 (Supp. 1974); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 37-
5A-16 to -27 (Supp. 1974); WAsH. REV. CODE ANx. § 19.100.030 (Supp.
1974); Wis. STAT. ANx. § 553.26 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974).
93. ORE. REV. STAT. § 650.010 (1974).
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-561 (1973).
95. Id. § 13.1-573.
96. CAL, CORP. CODE § 31113 (West Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
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however, are the private enforcement remedies created by some
of those statutes. Violations of the disclosure provisions give a
franchisee a cause of action for damages.0 7 The franchisee may
also bring an action for rescission,9 8 although two states require
a willful violation of the statute for this type of relief.90 In
Illinois, if the disclosure statement is not given to the prospec-
tive franchisee at least three days before the signing of the
agreement or the receipt of consideration by the franchisor, the
franchise agreement remains voidable at the option of the fran-
chisee for 90 days.10 0 While the requirement of a registration
statement should deter most questionable franchise schemes, it
will not guarantee that a franchisor is fully disclosing all neces-
sary information. Nevertheless, the private enforcement mech-
anism will assure the franchisee his day in court.1 0 '
A possible weakness in the enforcement provisions of some
of the disclosure laws is that pursuant to these statutes the
franchisor has a defense if he can establish that the franchisee
"knew the facts concerning the untruth or omission, or that the
defendant [franchisor] exercised reasonable care and did not
know, or, if he had exercised reasonable care, would not have
known, of the untruth or omission.'u 0 2 The Illinois, Minnesota,
and South Dakota statutes do not contain such a provision.
121 , § 711 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); S.D. Comp. LAws ANN. § 37-5A-
39 (Supp. 1974); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.050 (Supp. 1974).
97. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31300 (West Supp. 1975); HAWAn REV. STAT.
§ 482E-9(b) (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121%, § 721(1) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1974); MVINw. STAT. § 80C.17(1) (1974); R.I. GEN. LAws
ANN. § 19-28-9(A) (Supp. 1974); S.D. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 37-5A-83(Supp. 1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.190(2) (Supp. 1974); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 553.51(2) (Spec. Pamphlet 1974).
98. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 553.51(1) (Spec. Pamphlet 1974). In three
states the courts are given broad equitable powers to grant rescission
or other relief which the court may deem appropriate. Min. STAT. §
80C.17(1) (1974); S.D. Comp. LAws ANN. § 37-5A-83 (Supp. 1974);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.190 (2) (Supp. 1974).
99. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31300 (West Supp. 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 19-28-9(A) (Supp. 1974).
100. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 121%, § 721(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
101. Under such statutes, damages are usually limited to actual dam-
ages. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 31300 (West Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 1212, § 721 (1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); MiNN. STAT. § 80C.17(1)(1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 19-28-9 (A) (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 553.51(2) (Spec. Pamphlet 1974). Two states, however, allow
recovery "to an amount not to exceed three times actual damages sus-
tained." S.D. Comp. LAws ANN. § 37-5A-85 (Supp. 1974); WASH. REV
CODE ANN. § 19.100.190 (3) (Supp. 1974).
102. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31300 (West Supp. 1975); HAwAn REV. STAT.§ 482E-9(b) (Supp. 1974); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 19-28-9(B) (Supp.
1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.190(2) (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 553.51(2) (Spec. Pamphlet 1974).
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The state disclosure laws provide certain limited exemptions
from the registration requirements. In California and Wisconsin,
a franchisor with at least 25 franchisees and with a net worth of
at least five million dollars is exempt from the registration
requirement if he makes a limited disclosure in writing to the
prospective franchisee at least 48 hours prior to execution of
any franchise agreement. 10 3 The assumption that a franchisor
with such wealth, size, and business experience will not deceive
an unsuspecting franchisee has been criticized as fallacious.10 4
Yet, regulation will be successful without registration if the
prospective franchisee himself is supplied with sufficient infor-
mation to support a rational investment decision.
The Minnesota statute exempts from both the registration
requirement and the limited disclosure requirement any offer
or sale of a franchise by a franchisee, provided that there has
been no similar sale in the preceding 12 months; any trans-
action by an executor, administrator, sheriff, receiver, trustee in
bankruptcy, guardian, or conservator; any offer or sale to a
banking organization, financial organization, or life insurance
corporation; and any offer or sale of a "franchise" registered in
the state as a security. 105 Presumably either the parties to these
transactions are protected by their relative skill, or the disclo-
sure requirements are deemed to be unnecessary when the sale
is not in the ordinary course of business. The South Dakota and
Washington statutes exempt sales not in the ordinary course of
business'0" and exempt some other franchise operations on the
basis of size.' 0 7 Rather than provide fixed statutory criteria, the
103. CAL. Corn'. CODE § 31101 (West Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 553.22 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974). The 25 required franchisees must have
been conducting business at all times during the five years immediately
preceding the franchisor's offer to the prospective franchisee. Hawaii
has the same exemption if the franchisee must invest $100,000. HAwAii
REV. STAT. § 482E-4(4) (Supp. 1974). One state requires only 10 fran-
chises. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 19-28-4 (Supp. 1974).
104. State Legislation, supra note 34, at 545. Another critic has
stated that this is the first time that "bigness" has been equated with
"honesty." BROWN, supra note 2, at 113.
105. MiNN. STAT. §§ 80C.03, .06 (5) (1974).
106. S.D. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 37-5A-14 (Supp. 1974); WASH. REv
CODE ANN. § 10.100.030(1)-(3) (Supp. 1974). The Washington statute
does not exempt registered securities.
107. South Dakota requires operation of at least 25 franchises in the
United States for the previous 25 years and a net worth of at least ten
million dollars. S.D. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 37-5A-12 (Supp. 1974). Wash-
ington has three different exemptions based on the size of the franchisor:(1) a franchisor with at least 25 franchises, a net worth of at least five
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Illinois statute authorizes the secretary of state to specify the
disclosure requirements that will not be applied to any desig-
nated class of franchisors, if he finds that they are unnecessary
to the public interest or the protection of potential franchi-
sees. 08 This approach avoids the inflexibility of specific statuto-
ry exemption criteria, while enabling exemptions to be granted
when justified. Nor does this approach require statutory amend-
ment to withdraw exemption status when circumstances demon-
strate the need for such action.
C. THE ONGOING FRANcHIsE RELATIONSHIP: STANDARDS OF CON-
DUCT
A number of states have enacted legislation designed to
neutralize the great disparity in bargaining power between the
franchisor and the franchisee. Once the franchise relationship
has commenced and after the franchisee has invested large sums
of his own capital in the franchise operation, the franchisee may
be held by the franchisor to increasingly burdensome operating
standards. In an effort to avoid such problems, some states have
imposed "good faith" standards of conduct upon both parties to
a franchise agreement.10 9 Presumably, if a franchisor is re-
quired to deal in "good faith" with the franchisee, he will be
unable to impose unreasonably burdensome restrictions or stan-
dards of performance. Such terms as "good faith" and "fair and
equitable," however, invite litigation to determine their content;
they offer no unequivocal standard on which a franchisee may
rely."0 The Minnesota statute declares that the Commissioner
of Securities of the Department of Commerce shall adopt rules
defining the words "unfair and inequitable" as they relate to
franchises."' Because the commissioner has enforcement pow-
million dollars, and an initial investment requirement of $100,000; (2)
a franchisor offering fewer than ten franchises, who does not use mass
media for advertising the franchises; and (3) a franchisor who charges
a franchise fee less than $1500 per year, does not advertise by mass
media, and is in compliance with all applicable consumer protection
laws. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.030 (Supp. 1974).
108. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1213, § 712 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
109. HAWAII REv. STAT. § 482E-6(1) (Supp. 1974); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 19.100.180 (1) (Supp. 1974). The Minnesota law prohibits "unfair
and inequitable" conduct. MNN. STAT. § 80C.14 (1974). New Jersey
forbids the franchisor from imposing unreasonable standards of perform-
ance upon the franchisee. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-7(e) (Supp. 1975).
110. One view is that such terms are merely an expression of general
legislative policy. State Legislation, supra note 34, at 554.
111. MNNr. STAT. § 80C.14 (1974).
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ers under the law,"1 2 he might be in a better position to estab-
lish proper guidelines than the courts. Nonetheless, the proprie-
ty of the guidelines he establishes probably must await judicial
interpretation.
The New Jersey Franchise Practices Act prohibits six spe-
cific practices that are deemed to be contrary to fair and equita-
ble treatment of franchisees during the ongoing relationship. 113
The Washington statute is supplemented with even more specific
modes of conduct considered to be unfair or deceptive." 4 The
prohibited practices include restrictive purchasing agreements,
discrimination between franchisees in the price charged for like
goods and services, and the imposition of unreasonable condi-
tions on the franchisee."15 This statute goes further than the
law of any other state in establishing standards of conduct for
the parties to a franchise agreement. It permits a franchisee to
compare the treatment he is receiving from his franchisor with
the specific practices outlawed by the statute. As additional pro-
tection for the franchisee, the statute places the burden of proof
on the franchisor to show that any standard of conduct he
imposes is reasonable and necessary.1 16
D. TERMINATING T=E FRANcmsE RELATIoNsmip: LImIrATIONS
The wrongful termination of a franchise agreement, or the
unjust failure to renew the agreement, presents a difficult chal-
lenge to the drafters of remedial legislation. Delaware was the
first state to enact termination legislation.1 7 Franchisees pro-
tected by the statute" 8 were entitled to recover damages from
the franchisor for unjust termination," 9 and to seek a mandato-
112. Id. § 80C.16.
113. A franchisor may not require the franchisee to waive the pro-
tection of the Act; may not prohibit the free association of franchisees;
may not make changes in management without good cause stated in
writing; may not impose unreasonable standards of performance; may
not include in the franchise agreement any term that violates the Act;
and may not restrict the sale or transfer of equity in the franchise to
employees of the franchisee or to the heir of the principal owner as long
as basic financial requirements are met. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-7
(Supp. 1975).
114. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.100.180 (2) (a)- (j) (Supp. 1974).
115. Id. §§ 19.100.180 (2) (b), (c), (h).
116. Id. § 19.100.180 (2) (h).
117. DEL. CODE AN. tit. 6, § 2551 et seq. (1974).
118. Franchised wholesalers were protected by the law, but fran-
chisees who offer their goods and services directly to the general public
appear to have been excluded. State Legislation, supra note 34, at 559.
119. An unjust termination was defined as one effected "without
good cause or in bad faith." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2552(a) (1974).
19751
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ry order for renewal. 12 0 In Globe Liquor Co. v. Four Roses
Distillers Co., 12 1 however, the state supreme court held that the
statute made substantive changes in rights and obligations un-
der an existing franchise contract and was thus an unconstitu-
tional impairment of the contract.12 2 The court also held that
the damages provided by the statutes were punitive in nature
and therefore impermissible, since proof of actual loss was not
required.123
To avoid the Globe Liquor problem, the New Jersey statute,
which permits termination or nonrenewal of a franchise agree-
ment only for "good cause,'1 24 was drafted to apply only to
franchises granted after the effective date of the act.12r The
statute provides, however, that "a renewal of a franchise or an
amendment to an existing franchise shall not be excluded from
the application of the Act."'1 26 To avoid a construction that
would render this part of the statute unconstitutional, a New
Jersey court held that all preexisting franchises were intended
to be exempted from all regulatory provisions of the statute. 2 7
Although not technically applying the act, the court did exam-
ine the nonrenewal in light of the legislative policy expressed
therein, and found that the nonrenewal violated an implied cov-
enant in the agreement not to terminate as long as the franchi-
see substantially performed his obligations.12 8
The recently amended Connecticut statute' 29 attempts to
recognize certain business realities that will justify the franchi-
sor's refusal to renew a franchise agreement. The franchisor
may elect not to renew an agreement that involves the lease of
real property, if the franchisor then sells or leases the property
to other than a subsidiary or affiliate of the franchisor, or if he
120. Id. § 2553.
121. 281 A.2d 19 (Del.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971).
122. Id. at 21. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
123. 281 A.2d at 24.
124. "Good cause" is limited to failure by the franchisee to substan-
tially comply with the reasonable requirements imposed by the fran-
chisor. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-5 (Supp. 1975).
125. Id. § 56:10-8.
126. N.J. STAT. AN. § 56:10-8 (Supp. 1975).
127. Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super. 357, 370, 294 A.2d
253, 260, modified on other grounds, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973).
See also Marinello v. Shell Oil Co., 511 F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1975) (the New
Jersey common law which protects franchisees from termination without
cause was not rendered invalid by passage of the Lanham Act and appli-
cation of the supremacy clause).
128. 120 N.J. Super. at 376, 294 A.2d at 263.
129. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANw. §§ 42-133e-g (Supp. 1975).
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sells or leases the property to a subsidiary or affiliate for a
different business purpose than that for which it was previously
employed by the franchisee, or if he converts the property to a
use not covered by the franchise agreement, or if the property
was originally leased from a third party and such lease is termi-
nated.130 Arguably, these exceptions are embraced by the gener-
al "good cause" provision,' 13 but the explicit reference to them
ensures recognition that there may be times when good business
judgment calls for nonrenewal of the franchise relationship
even though the franchisee has complied with the obligations of
the agreement. The statute does not allow a franchisor to refuse
renewal and reacquire a successful franchise business for the
sole purpose of operating the business himself. Upon termina-
tion of the franchise relationship for whatever reason, the fran-
chisee is entitled to receive fair and reasonable compensation for
the inventory, supplies, equipment, and furnishings purchased
from the franchisor or from approved sources.1 32 The franchisee
is thus assured that he will not be left with property that is
utterly useless to him once the franchise relationship has ended.
The statutes of Virginia and Washington also deal with the
problem of termination, although neither is intended to provide
comprehensive solutions to the problem. The Virginia statute
prohibits cancellation of a franchise without "reasonable
cause.' 3 This standard is not defined and it is unclear whether
"reasonable cause" is a less stringent standard than "good
cause." If "reasonable cause" were construed in light of a
"sound business judgment" standard, the effectiveness of the
termination provision would be severely limited and it might be
applicable only to reprisals against the franchisee; certainly the
standard must be closer to the "good cause" standard illustrated
by the Connecticut statute. On the other hand, Washington, like
Connecticut, prohibits termination without "good cause.'1
34
While "good cause" includes noncompliance with material provi-
sions of the agreement, the franchisee is given a reasonable
opportunity to cure any default.1 3 5
130. Id. § 42-133f.
131. Id.
132. Id. § 42-133f(b).
133. VA. CODE AN. § 13.1-564 (1973).
134. WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.180(2) (j) (Supp. 1974). Prior
to a 1973 amendment, Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1973, ch. 33, § 4, termina-
tion had been permitted for "just cause." Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1971,
ch. 252, § 18. It has been observed that the "just cause" standard re-
quired only that all franchisees be treated equally. State Legislation,
supra note 34, at 562-63.
135. WAsH. REV. CODE AmN. § 19.100.180(2) (j) (Supp. 1974).
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E. THE NEED FOR UNIFoRM REGULATION
The problems that plague the franchising industry are sim-
ply too significant to ignore.136 Common-law theories and exist-
ing statutory remedies not specifically applicable to franchising
do not adequately deal with the complex and unique character-
istics of the franchise relationship. This situation has been rec-
ognized by the 15 states that have enacted comprehensive
legislation regulating the franchise relationship. The other
states, however, are without such comprehensive franchise legis-
lation, and even the statutes of those 15 states vary greatly
in their applicability to franchise relationships. A few states
require disclosure of relevant information, some attempt to reg-
ulate the ongoing relationship, others place restrictions on the
right to terminate, and still others combine these regulatory
approaches in a single statute. Even among those states that
regulate similar aspects of the franchise relationship, the statu-
tory requirements differ substantially.
This lack of uniformity places a great hardship on franchi-
sors who operate on a national scale.137 A national franchise
operation may come within the statutory language of one state
law although it is excluded from the regulation of another. When
the relevant information required to be disclosed differs from
state to state, the franchisor will be forced to prepare different
disclosure or registration statements. Equitable standards of
conduct, such as the requirement to deal in "good faith," are
dependent on judicial interpretations in various states; as a con-
sequence, no single interpretation controls and both parties are
unsure of the boundaries of "good faith" conduct. A franchisor
may be prohibited from imposing certain standards upon the
franchisee in one state, whereas the same practice is perfectly
legal in a neighboring state.1 38 Not only has this patchwork
136. The International Franchise Association (IFA) has stated that
there are sufficient remedies available at this time, but most commenta-
tors would disagree. See Statement on Behalf of IFA Before Federal
Trade Commission Hearing on the Proposed Trade Regulation Rule-
February 14, 1972, Hearings on the Role of Small Business in Franchising
Before the Subcomm. on Minority Business Enterprise and Franchising
of the House Comm. on Small Business, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 307 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings]. See generally BROWN, supra note
2; Brown & Cohen, Franchise Misuse, 48 NoTRE DAME LAW. 1145 (1973);
Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-Franchise Can-
cellations, 1967 DuKE L.J. 465.
137. See Statement of Philip Zeidman, 1973 Hearings, supra note
136, at 16-19.
138. For example, the Washington statute sets out ten specifically
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legislative approach impaired the effectiveness of franchise reg-
ulation, but it also has convinced the franchisors' trade associa-
tion that further regulation should be pursued on the federal
level, and that such uniform regulation would be a boon to the
franchising industry.139
The states themselves may also favor federal regulation.
Many states may lack the necessary administrative machinery
to effectively implement franchise regulation.140 Political and
economic realities may dampen a state's desire to supervise
franchise relationships. The prohibitive administrative costs and
the difficulties of compliance with diverse state laws imply that
practical solutions to the problems of franchising must be
sought at the federal level.141
III. THE FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE APPROACH
Congress has not been unaware of the abuses that may
occur in the franchise relationship. Numerous remedial bills
have been introduced by members of Congress in the past ten
years,'1 42 although very few of the proposals have ever received
serious consideration. The Automobile Dealers Franchise Act14 3
prohibited practices, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.100.180(2) (Supp. 1974),
see text accompanying notes 114-16 supra, while the Oregon franchise
statute is silent as to the standards of conduct between the parties to
a franchise agreement.
139. Statement of Philip Zeidman, 1973 Hearings, supra note 136,
at 19.
140. See State Legislation, supra note 34, at 551.
141. Report of Lewis Rudnick 4th Annual Franchising and Govern-
ment Symposium of the IFA, May 17, 18, and 19, 1971, at 5, cited in State
Legislation, supra note 34, at 551 & n.140.
142. E.g., H.R. 13628, S. 1967, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 2321 &
S. 2507, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); I.R. 11972, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966); H.R. 10113, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). For an appraisal of
these early legislative proposals, see Zeidman, Legislative Supervision
of the Franchise Contract: Throwing Out the Baby with the Bath
Water?, 15 N.Y.L.F. 19 (1969).
143. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1970). Called the Automobile Dealers'
Day in Court Act, this statute requires all parties to the franchise agree-
ment to deal with each other in a "fair and equitable manner." Id. §
1221(e). A franchisee may bring a suit for damages if the franchisor
fails to perform the contract in "good faith," including termination or
nonrenewal. Id. § 1222. The dealer-franchisee has the burden of estab-
lishing the breach of "good faith." Southern Rambler Sales, Inc. v.
American Motors Corp., 375 F.2d 932, 935 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 832 (1967). For a discussion of the political and legislative history of
this law, see Macauley, Changing a Continuing Relationship Between a
Large Corporation and Those Who Deal With It: Automobile Manufac-




is the only specific federal legislation enacted to date. Applicable
only to franchise relationships within a particular industry, the
Act reveals the limited scope of existing federal regulation. Leg-
islation applicable to all significant franchise operations would
be preferable to the present piecemeal approach. There are
three possible avenues to federal regulation of franchising: (1)
action by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) under its rule-
making power, (2) federal preemptive legislation, and (3) feder-
al nonpreemptive legislation.
A. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION RULEMAKING
For the past four years, the FTC has given close attention
to the problems that exist in the franchising industry. Acting to
prohibit unfair and deceptive trade practices pursuant to section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,144 the FTC has pro-
posed a trade regulation rule, which, if approved, would require
franchisors to disclose certain information to a prospective fran-
chisee prior to the signing of any binding agreement.14 The
authority of the agency to issue such regulations has been ques-
tioned,146 but recently the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that the Federal Trade Commission Act
did confer upon the FTC the authority to promulgate trade
regulation rules having the effect of substantive law.147 This
decision should remove any doubt as to the power of the FTC to
require compliance with rules regulating franchising.
The extensive hearings held by the FTC on its first pro-
posed franchising rule 48 in February 1972 thoroughly familiar-
ized the agency with the problems that beset both the franchi-
sor and the franchisee. The proposed rule would require
disclosure of information directly to the prospective franchisee.
This approach would be more direct than the state registration
requirements, since the pertinent information would be chan-
neled immediately to the person making the investment deci-
sion. A significant drawback to unilateral FTC action as an
effective solution to franchise regulation, however, is the ab-
sence of a private enforcement provision in the Federal Trade
144. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
145. 36 Fed. Reg. 21607 (1971), revised and reissued, 39 Fed. Reg.
30360 (1974).
146. Comment, Franchise Regulation: Ohio Considers Legislation
To Protect the Franchisee, 33 OHto STATE L.J. 643, 650 (1973).
147. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
148. 36 Fed. Reg. 21607 (1971).
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Commission Act. While franchisees might be somewhat protected
by FTC policing efforts, the absence of a private enforcement
provision would permit an injured franchisee to be made whole
only under a common-law or statutory remedy not well-suited
to abuses in the franchise relationship. 149 The deterrent effect
of the regulation would also be reduced by the absence of an
effective self-protection provision, since the FTC could not be
expected to prosecute all violations.
B. FEDERAL PREEmPTm LEGISLATION
Preemptive legislation offers a second approach to federal
regulation of the franchise relationship.150 If Congress enacted
preemptive legislation, state legislation could not constitutionally
apply in the same area and consideration would ordinarily not be
given to competing state policies in the enforcement of the fed-
eral statute.' 51 Such federal legislation could provide franchisees
with the private enforcement remedy that FTC unilateral action
would lack. The legislation would enable Congress to select
the best provisions of the existing state regulatory schemes.
The franchisors naturally favor the federal preemptive ap-
proach when confronted with a choice between existing piece-
meal state regulation and uniform federal legislative require-
ments. 5 2 Support of a moderate federal law to supplant all
state regulation offers the franchisors an opportunity to elimi-
nate those state laws that they find too restrictive or burden-
some. Federal preemptive legislation, however, is probably an
unnecessarily harsh solution, especially for those states that de-
sire to regulate the franchise relationship by means of strong
legislation. Fifteen states have expressed strong protective pur-
poses in the enactment of comprehensive franchise legisla-
tion.1 3 A less stringent preemptive federal law might under-
mine those purposes.
149. See text accompanying notes 8-54 supra.
150. Joan Z. Bernstein, the acting director of the FTC Bureau of Con-
sumer Protection, has suggested that federal preemptive legislation is the
best approach in dealing with the franchise relationship. 1973 Hearings,
supra note 136, at 189.
151. See Note, Franchise Terminations and Refusals to Renew: The
Lanham Act and Preemption of State Regulation, 60 IowA L. REV. 122,
131 (1974).
152. See generally Statement of Philip Zeidman, 1973 Hearings,
supra note 136, at 16.
153. See text accompanying notes 55-141 supra.
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If Congress adopted a nonpreemptive legislative approach,
federal regulation of the franchise relationship could coexist
with state regulation, just as it does in the securities field. Such
coexistence would be possible because the supremacy clause of
the Constitution could be invoked to invalidate any state legisla-
tion that conflicted with the federal legislation,'5 4 although
state laws that were not inconsistent with the federal statute
would be permitted to stand.155 Nonpreemptive federal legisla-
tion would thus preserve the power of individual states to su-
pervise the general conduct of business, by permitting states to
enact stronger, but compatible, protective legislation. While non-
preemptive legislation would not guarantee the complete uni-
formity of regulation which the franchisors strongly desire, it
would provide a focal point to which state regulatory schemes
might gravitate. In addition, the costs of implementation and
enforcement of a comprehensive state franchise statute are such
that many states might welcome federal legislation.
D. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AS THE ENoRcEMENT AGENCY
Whichever federal statutory approach is selected, an agency
must be designated to supervise compliance with the statutory
standards. Clearly, costs and considerations of efficiency would
discourage the establishment of a new federal agency to deal
exclusively with franchising. From among the existing agencies,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the FTC
have been suggested as the most suitable candidates for enforc-
ing a federal franchise statute.156 The SEC has vast experience
with disclosure requirements, while the FTC constantly deals
with unfair trade practices such as those which might occur in a
franchise relationship. It would be inefficient to assign two su-
pervisory agencies to the regulation of franchising. Despite the
similarities between franchising and the trading of securities in
the requirement for disclosure, it has been recognized that the
154. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
155. Note, supra note 151, at 131.
156. The 'Franchise Full Disclosure Act of 1970," S. 3844, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970), introduced by Senator Williams of New Jersey, would
have required franchisors to register with the SEC and to disclose certain
material facts to a potential franchisee. The 1971 revision of this bill
would have given regulatory powers to the FTC. S. 2870, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971). The 'ranchise Act of 1974," H.R. 16239, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974), introduced by Representative Young of Illinois and
others, would have selected the SEC.
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securities laws are ill-suited for application to the franchise
relationship. 157 The SEC would thus have to operate in an area
unrelated to its primary field if it were required to en-
force a franchising statute. On the other hand, considering
the extensive investigatory work already done by the FTC in
the area of franchising' 58 and that agency's general experience
with unfair and deceptive trade practices, the FTC is the logical
choice to supervise federal regulation of the franchise relation-
ship. Since the agency has already been exposed to the unique
problems that beset the industry, a federal statute with FTC
enforcement could be effective soon after enactment.
IV. CONSIDERATIONS FOR A FEDERAL STATUTE
The realities of the franchise relationship demonstrate the
need for federal regulation. But since regulation of franchising
is relatively recent and untested, action on the federal level
must be carefully considered so as not to stifle future growth in
franchising industries. 159 Serious problems must be dealt with
constructively without unreasonably restricting the franchisor's
freedom to conduct his business economically. A federal non-
preemptive statute enforced by the Federal Trade Commission
offers an attractive source for that constructive regulation. The
FTC can be given the discretionary rulemaking power to tighten
or relax the regulation as needed, enabling the statute to be
effective without becoming oppressive. Each problem area of the
franchising statute must be closely examined, and any federal
franchising statute must be carefully drafted to ensure proper
treatment of those areas.
A. DEFINING THE FRACMSE RELATIONSHIP
A fundamental ingredient of any legislation is the defini-
tional section of the statute. The statutory definition of terms of
art and key words and phrases-such as "franchise," "franchi-
sor," "franchisee," '"prospective franchisee," and "franchise fee"
-will have major impact on the scope of franchising legisla-
tion.1 0 The various definitions are crucial, regardless of wheth-
157. See, e.g., Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 460 F.2d 666
(10th Cir. 1972).
158. See text accompanying notes 144-48 supra.
159. For example, it has been reported that five large franchisors in-
tend to stay out of New Jersey and Washington because of the restrictive
nature of the franchise statutes of those states. Wall Street Journal, Oct.
11, 1971, at 22, col. 3.
160. For a comparison of three statutory definitional approaches, see
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er the statutory purpose is to cure franchise abuses by disclo-
sure requirements, by regulation of the ongoing relationship, by
limitation of the ability to terminate the franchise, or by a
combination of these. The most important definition is clearly
that of the term "franchise," since the meaning of most other
terms will depend upon it.
Since the concept of franchising is nebulous, an umbrella
definition of the term "franchise" may inadvertently encompass
many conventional business relationships that do not merit stat-
utory regulation.1' 1 The statutory coverage must be limited to
those business arrangements in which franchising abuses occur.
The definition should require the business arrangement to in-
volve some "continuing commercial relationship" in which both
parties contribute in some manner to the operation of the fran-
chised business. The statute must be drafted carefully, so that
the conventional manufacturer-wholesaler-retailer chain of dis-
tribution is not subject to its restrictions.
The serious franchising problems warranting legislative at-
tention generally involve those marketing arrangements in
which the essential element is a trademark liceise.1 62 Accord-
ingly, the definition of a "franchise" should be phrased in terms
of the substantial association of the franchisee's business with
the franchisor's trademark, trade name, or other commercial
symbol. The important concept of the franchisor's continued
control over the operation of the franchise would thus be incor-
porated into the definition by operation of the federal trade-
mark laws, 6 3 effectively eliminating the line-drawing problems
in drafting the franchising statutes.16 4 If the definition of a
39 Fed. Reg. 30360 (1974) (proposed FTC rule); CAL. CORP. CODE §§
31002-19 (West Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE Axx. §§ 19.100.010(1) -(15)
(Supp. 1974).
161. The first proposed trade regulation contained such an umbrella
definition. 36 Fed. Reg. 21607, 21609 (1971). The International Fran-
chise Association felt that the proposed rule would cover "virtually every
form of sale by one party of the goods produced by, or the services origi-
nated by, another party, if that other party exerts even the most minimal
form of 'control' required by economic necessity or by the trademark
laws." Statement on Behalf of International Franchise Association Be-
fore Federal Trade Commission Hearing on Proposed Trade Regulation
Rule-February 14, 1972, 1973 Hearings, supra note 136, at 304.
162. See 1 J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAI COMPErITION §
18:20, at 644-45 (1973).
163. See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra. For a closer look at
the relationship of franchise termination legislation to trademark licens-
ing, see Note, Franchise Termination and Refusals to Renew: The Lan-
ham Act and Preemption of State Regulation, 60 IowA L. REv. 122 (1974).
164. This approach is taken by the first alternative of the revised
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franchise were framed in terms of the degree of control the
franchisor exercises over the franchisee, Congress would be
forced to require "substantial" control, or to establish a similar
standard, and then to await judicial interpretation as to the
exact scope of the provision. On the other hand, a definition
framed in terms of the representations made by the franchisor
and the assistance he gives the franchisee, as well as in terms of
substantial association with a trademark, might avoid these
problems, while still requiring the parties to be closely connect-
ed with the franchise operation.
Consideration should be given to a minimum franchise fee
provision, limiting the coverage of the statute by providing an
exemption for small-scale franchisors. Such a provision might
also ensure that the statutory regulation does not discourage
the development of new franchise systems.16 5 Any minimum fee
provision must be carefully drafted so that a franchisor requir-
ing a small initial fee with subsequent large payments or com-
mitments does not escape the coverage of the statute.166
The expenses of meeting disclosure requirements can be
heavy, and termination limitations can severely restrict the
franchisor's freedom. Therefore, it would be preferable to have
a definition of franchise that is slightly too narrow than one
that is too broad. The franchise relationship entails a great
many varied business arrangements. The requirement of a con-
tinuing commercial relationship including trademark or trade
name licensing would exclude many of the business relation-
FTC rule. The second alternative appears to rest the definition on the
concept of "control," but does not specify the degree of control required.
39 Fed. Reg. 30360, 30362 (1974) (proposed rule).
165. The question whether franchising is a worthwhile method of
product distribution is not entirely settled. See text accompanying notes
1-7 supra. Nevertheless, statutory regulation should not erect a barrier
to new franchise systems. A minimum franchise fee provision would
help prevent this.
166. For the various forms of payment a franchisor might require,
see note 71 supra. The Washington Franchise Investment Protection Act
contains a broad definition of a franchise fee. It includes
any fee or charge that a franchisee or subfranchisor is required
to pay or agrees to pay for the right to enter into a business or
to continue a business under a franchise agreement, including,
but not limited to, the payment either in lump sum or by in-
staliments of an initial capital investment fee, any fee or charges
based upon a percentage of gross or net sales whether or not re-
ferred to as royalty fees, any payment for the mandatory pur-
chase of goods or services or any payment for goods or services
available only from the franchisor, or any training fees or train-
ing school fees or charges ....
WAsH. Rrv. CODE ANN. § 19.100.010 (11) (Supp. 1974).
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ships in which serious franchising abuses are not prevalent. A
minimum fee provision could prevent the statute from erecting
a barrier to entry into the franchising business. FTC rulemak-
ing power under the statute could then be used to make the
"fine-tuning" adjustments necessary to meet changing economic
conditions.
B. ENTERING THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP
Misrepresentation in the promotion of franchises is one of
the most serious abuses in franchising, and a requirement of
full disclosure of pertinent information is the appropriate legis-
lative solution. 16 7 The mandatory communication of specific in-
formation directly to prospective franchisees prior to entry into
the franchise relationship is thus a crucial requirement of any
franchising statute.'0 8 For example, disclosure of the names and
business addresses of those associated with the franchisor would
acquaint the franchise with the persons with whom he will be
doing business during the contract term. In addition, disclosure
of the franchisor's balance sheets and profit and loss statements
for the previous three years' 6 9 and information about the busi-
ness experience of the franchisor and its officers and directors
167. Disclosure bills have received the most attention in Congress
recently. See, e.g., H.R. 16239, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S. 2399 & S.
2870, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
168. It makes good business sense to inform the franchisee of what
he is getting from the investment, according to most reputable fran-
chisors. Disagreement occurs with respect to the degree of disclosure
that should be required. The first set of FTC proposed disclosure re-
quirements were substantially similar to those of the California statute.
See 36 Fed. Reg. 21607, 21607-09 (1971); CAL. CORP. CODE § 31000 (West
Supp. 1975). One writer felt that these rules were not entirely justified
and that there were many qualified and ethical franchisors who should
not have to meet such strict standards. Rosenfield, A Look at the Pro-
posed F.T.C. Rule on Franchising, 27 Bus. LAw. 907, 914 (1972). Another
commentator stated that compliance with many portions of the rule
would be extremely burdensome or impossible. Zeidman, Regulation of
Franchising by the Federal Trade Commission: A Critique of the Pro-
posed Trade Regulation Rule, 28 Bus. LAw. 135 (1972). As a result of
extensive testimony from both franchisors and franchisees, the revised
FTC proposal retreated somewhat in the degree of disclosure required.
Nevertheless, these regulations would greatly aid the prospective fran-
chisee in this decisional process.
169. The revised FTC rule would require only the most recent bal-
ance sheet and profit and loss statement. The original proposed rule
would have required those statements for the previous five years. Cal-
ifornia and Washington require only a recent financial statement. CAL.




would enable the franchisee to better evaluate his chances of
success in the franchise business. A right to examine the fran-
chisor's financial position prior to investing could further pro-
tect the franchisee from making an investmenV without full
knowledge of all relevant facts. Finally, since a prospective
franchisee might not understand all the intricacies of franchise
payment, a provision requiring a complete and full disclosure of
all fees, compensation, or other forms of payment received by
the franchisor could be included to alert the franchisee to hid-
den payments. This information should explain the method of
computation used in determining the revenue received by the
franchisor for supplying goods and services to the franchisee. 1'7 0
Attention must be paid to the ease with which franchise
systems are formed. The only prerequisites are a salable prod-
uct and the ability to market the product. Naturally, this fur-
nishes opportunities to unprincipled franchisors. Disclosure of
past and pending litigation against the franchisor and its offi-
cers and directors would offer a degree of protection against
this problem. The prospective franchisee would be adequately
protected against unprincipled franchisors by the inclusion in
this list of all operational officers and directors.17 ' Additional
protection might be provided if the list also included those offi-
cers and directors who had served the franchisor in the pre-
vious two years, even if they were no longer affiliated with the
company.
In theory, the disclosure made by the franchisor should
expose the prospective franchisee to the realities of the fran-
chise system. To be entirely consistent with the notion of full
and fair disclosure, the franchisee should be given access to the
operating statements of unprofitable as well as profitable fran-
chises. If the franchisor presents statements about the projected
future success of the operation, those statements must be clearly
understood as mere estimates that should not be interpreted as
fact.1'7 2 The disclosure provisions can require proper labeling of
170. A franchisor may supply goods or services that are greatly over-
priced. The prospective franchisee should be aware that the franchisor
intends to realize part of his profit from these transactions. The 1971
proposed FTC rule would have required disclosure of the "mark-ups"
on such items, but the revised rule eliminated this requirement. See 36
Fed. Reg. 21607, 21608 (1971); 39 Fed. Reg. 30360 (1974).
171. The 1971 proposed FTC rule would have required the franchisor
to include in such a summary all stockholders who owned more than
10 percent of all stock of the franchisor. 36 Fed. Reg. 21607 (1971).
172. The California and Washington statutes require the disclosure
of the basis upon which estimates of earnings are obtained. CAL. CoRP.
19751 1059
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
these statements to prevent misinterpretation.'7 3
The drafters of a federal disclosure statute must deal with
the exemption question.1'7 4 The proposition that large, experi-
enced franchisors always deal fairly and equitably with prospec-
tive franchisees cannot be assumed without question.1'7 5 The
FTC might be given discretionary power to grant exemptions to
franchisors who can establish that their prospective franchisees
do not require the full protection of the federal statute.1 76 This
would avoid the necessity of devising specific exemption criter-
ia, which would result in a blanket exemption. On the other
hand, exemption provisions for franchisors who otherwise fall
within the statutory definition are not an absolute necessity.'77
If the definitional section is drafted carefully, to include only
those business arrangements that require statutory regulation,
exemptions should not be needed, although discretionary power
in the FTC to deal with highly unusual circumstances would
guarantee that undue hardships were not inflicted by the stat-
ute.
A federal statute would have to designate an agency to
supervise compliance with the statutory requirements. The FTC
could be given the power to promulgate the rules and regula-
tions necessary to fully effectuate the disclosure requirements
CoDE § 31111(p) (West Supp. 1975); WASH. Rnv. CODE ANN. § 19.100.040
(17) (Supp. 1974).
173. The revised FTC rule would require the franchisor to furnish
the franchisee with a copy of FTC Buyer's Guide No. 4-Franchise Busi-
ness Risks at the same time the written disclosure is furnished. 39 Fed.
Reg. 30360, 30362 (1974).
174. See text accompanying notes 103-08 supra.
175. A national petroleum company once advertised a service station
in a Canadian newspaper as an "excellent opportunity . . . [to] make
a good income. Our research indicates strong potential." In fact, the
previous five lessees had operated the station only 5 months, 34 months,
23 months, 1 month, and 58 months respectively, with the most recent
dealer having been driven into bankruptcy. BROWN, supra note 2, at
76-77 n.64.
176. The "Franchise Fair Disclosure Act of 1971," S. 2870, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971), proposed a similar approach. This bill received the sup-
port of some franchising authorities. Harold Brown, a Boston attorney
and author of numerous articles and books on franchising, stated: "[I]f
you were to consider legislation, I would tell you very quickly, I would
also support ... S. 2870 .... I think it covers everything legislation
in this field should cover and I would recommend it most strongly to
you." 1973 Hearings, supra note 136, at 92.
177. The revised trade regulation rule does not exempt any fran-
chisors who meet the general definition. The Small Business Adminis-
tration was especially eager to support this no-exemption approach.
1973 Hearings, supra note 136, at 373.
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of the act.1 7 8 Failure to comply with either the disclosure re-
quirements or the rules and regulations promulgated thereun-
der could be made a violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade
Comnmission Act.179 The FTC would have the power to seek
injunctive relief for violations or threatened violations of the
statute. A damages provision allowing private enforcement of
violations would be an effective complement to ensure compli-
ance by the franchise industry. Treble damages could be consid-
ered, 8 0 but such a provision might be ineffective or unnecessar-
ily harsh to accomplish the purposes of the statute.1 8 1
For a disclosure statute to be effective, a prospective fran-
chisee must have the opportunity to study the information and
seek advice from others. The information should be provided as
soon as possible after the franchisee undertakes serious consid-
eration of the offer, or at least within some stated period, per-
haps 15 days, prior to entry into the franchise relation-
ship. 8 2 If a franchisor were required to file a copy of the
disclosure statement with the FTC prior to giving it to prospec-
tive franchisees, 8 3 the agency could then review the statement
and require additional information if necessary for the protec-
tion of prospective franchisees. The expertise of the FTC would
also be a further protection against misleading or deceptive in-
formation.
C. THE ONGOING RELATIONSHIP
Certain practices in the ongoing franchise relationship de-
serve legislative attention. Statutory standards that require par-
ties to a franchise agreement to deal with each other in "good
faith" or in a "fair and equitable" manner can invite unneces-
sary litigation and upset the cooperative balance of mutual ef-
fort that should characterize the franchise relationship. Neither
178. See, e.g., S. 2399 & S. 2870, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
179. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
180. See, e.g., "Franchise Full Disclosure Act of 1970," S. 2399, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). For further discussion of this bill, see State Leg-
islation, supra note 34, at 564-65; Comment, Franchise Regulation: Ohio
Considers Legislation To Protect the Franchisee, 33 OHio STATE L.J. 643
(1972).
181. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
182. See, e.g., 39 Fed. Reg. 30360 (1974).
183. Under the approach of the typical state disclosure law, a fran-
chisor must register with the state before doing business within its bor-
ders. This is done by filing an extensive disclosure statement. See text
accompanying notes 88-108 supra.
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the parties nor the courts have any bench mark from which to
measure compliance with these standards.
This does not eliminate the possibility that the federal stat-
ute might deal with the problems that beset the ongoing fran-
chise relationship. A disclosure statute might also set out "pro-
hibited practices," which the franchisor would be required to
disclose to the franchisee as a guarantee that those practices
would not be utilized. The franchisor could also be required to
disclose the standards of performance he expects the franchisee
to meet. The FTC could review those standards and prohibit the
imposition of any standard it found to be unfair. Such limited
measures should not constitute an undue interference with the
franchise relationship.
D. TERmINATING THE FRANCIc SE RELATIONSHIP
Termination legislation on the state level has often run
afoul of the contracts clause, 8 4 while federal termination legis-
lation has been repeatedly proposed without much success. 8 r A
statute based upon a desire to prevent unjustified terminations
could convert an ordinary franchise agreement into an employ-
ment contract of indefinite duration. It makes little sense to
force upon the franchisor an unwanted franchisee at the end of
a contract term. It is possible, however, that a franchisor might
have an ulterior motive in the cancellation of a franchise and
might unjustly deprive the franchisee of his livelihood. Accord-
ingly, the federal disclosure statute might also require the fran-
chisor to justify the nonrenewal of a franchise agreement. The
original disclosure statement could be required to include the
conditions under which a franchise agreement might be can-
celled or renewal of the agreement refused. Those conditions
would then be subject to FTC scrutiny.18 6
Consideration might also be given to the rights of each
party upon the conclusion of the franchise relationship. This
could be handled statutorily without significant difficulty. For
184. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10. See text accompanying notes 118-28
supra.
185. Senator Hart of Michigan has introduced several bills entitled
Fairness in Franchising Acts. S. 840, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 2472,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 2321, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
186. An attempted cancellation would be suspicious if the franchisor
sought to end the relationship with a successful franchisee in hopes of
taking over the operation himself. Because of the power the franchisor
wields over the franchisee, this type of action must be closely scru-
tinized for inequitable action. See text accompanying notes 129-32 supra.
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example, a franchisee could be assured by the disclosure state-
ment prior to his entry into the franchise relationship that he
will receive reasonable compensation for his investment at the
conclusion of the relationship. If the franchisor terminates the
relationship, the franchisee should be compensated at fair mar-
ket value for all property which he has been required to pur-
chase from the franchisor or approved sources.1 87 Goodwill
might be considered a component in the reasonable value of the
franchise. 88 The valuation of goodwill would vary with the
relative success and longevity of the franchisee's business.
V. CONCLUSION
Franchising is a vital force in the economy today, but seri-
ous problems may arise in the franchising relationship. Judicial
attempts to apply common-law theories or existing statutes to
the franchise relationship have met with limited success. More-
over, franchise regulation requires a degree of uniformity which
state legislation cannot achieve. A comprehensive federal dis-
closure statute enforced by the FTC could effectively deal with
many of the persistent problems. Legislation must be carefully
drafted so as to address the major problem areas without un-
duly restricting the growth of franchising. Such legislation
would help bring order to the present regulatory schemes and
permit continued expansion in this important field.
187. Some or all of the physical plant may be leased from the fran-
chisor. If that is the case, reimbursement should not be necessary. But
the FTC should have the power to examine the lease agreement to ensure
that it is not actually an installment contract.
188. See Brown & Cohen, Franchise Misuse, 48 NomE Dum LAw.
1145 (1973).
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